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Historically, the United States and Aotearoa/New Zealand symbolize opposite poles of an individualist-collectivist welfare state
continuum. Until recently, Aotearoa/New Zealand was known as a "cradle-to-grave" welfare state, with "universal" employment
and coverage in health and education. U.S. history, in contrast, is marked by an unabashed individualism and a residualist approach
to welfare. Recent neoliberal reforms, however, have engendered a convergence between the two countries in the conceptualiza-
tion and organization of assistance for poor single mothers. Most notable are the "workfare" provisions of legislative changes made
in 1996 in the two countries, which work to reconstitute poor mothers as potential able-bodied workers. In this article we analyze
welfare reform in the United States and Aotearoa/New Zealand, with particular reference to how poor single mothers respond to,
comply and cope with, or resist neoliberal strategies. Analysis is based on participant-observation, interviews, and focus groups
conducted between 1989 and 1999. [welfare reform, neoliberalism, globalization, gender, the United States, Aotearoa/New Zea-
land]
[Welfare] programs .. . degrade and enslave millions. They
have made generations of Americans nothing more than ani-
mals in the Government barn. [U.S. Representative Funder-
burk, in U.S. Government 1995]
At a certain point an overly generous welfare system will
make it more worthwhile for whole categories of people to
rely on the State rather than their own initiative. [National
Party of New Zealand 1993:15]
These two quotes are emblematic of the discourse ofwelfare reform in the United States and New Zea-land,1 and they are also representative of discourses
being produced in other Western welfare states with regard
to the restructuring of social provisioning. The point being
made, in both cases, is that welfare as we have known it
has promoted parasitic behavior, thereby discouraging de-
velopment of the capacities requisite to proper personhood
and citizenship, namely, independence, autonomy, and
self-sufficiency. The purported solution to the evil of
"trapping people at their lowest and least" (U.S. Senator
Ashcroft, in U.S. Government 1996) is "reform," entailing
liberation from welfare.
This new/recycled approach to poverty and provisioning
marks the consolidation of a shift from Keynesian to neo-
liberal forms of governance. The shift entails a particular
double bind for poor single mothers. It is well known that
women have higher poverty rates than men because they
suffer various forms of discrimination in the workplace
and are more likely to have sole custody of dependent chil-
dren (Starrels et al. 1994). The shift to neoliberal govern-
ance serves to heighten this vulnerability, insofar as it rep-
resents a shift from the constitution of women as mothers
and housewives to their constitution as potential able-
bodied workers.2 In this new regime, motherhood is no
longer regarded as a legitimate reason for poor women's
reliance on the state; accordingly, poor mothers on welfare
have become the targets of welfare reform measures.3
In some respects, the U.S. and New Zealand govern-
ments have recently adopted similar positions in their con-
ceptualizations and organizations of financial assistance
for poor single mothers. In essence, both countries have
worked toward tightening eligibility requirements and in-
stitutionalizing workfare. In the process of these reforms,
the programs traditionally targeting poor single mothers—
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Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) in the
United States and the Domestic Purposes Benefit (DPB) in
New Zealand—have been transformed to reflect and en-
courage new subjectivities on the part of their beneficiar-
ies. This apparent convergence, with particular reference to
the reconstitution of gendered subjectivity, is the focus of
our analysis here. Our concern is threefold. First, we are in-
terested in both similarities and differences between New
Zealand and the United States at the discursive/program-
matic level of policy and popular debate. Second, we are
interested in the experiences of the targets of the reforms.
How do poor single mothers in these two contexts discur-
sively interpret, respond to, comply and cope with, or resist
neoliberal strategies? How are they struggling to constitute
their own subjectivities? Finally, we are interested in the
relationship between poor single mothers' and compara-
tivist scholars' readings of the political/social terrain. How
do theoretical models of globalization intertwine with eve-
ryday experiences? The relationship between the two is
messy and even contradictory; not only is the trajectory of
globalization itself multilinear, but the trajectory of indi-
vidual lives caught up in globalizing processes may be sur-
prisingly varied.
We begin with a discussion of the global context of wel-
fare reform and of the rise of neoliberalism as a cultural
system. We then sketch an overall historical and concep-
tual characterization of welfare programs in New Zealand
and the United States, with particular reference to those
measures directed at poor single mothers both before and
after the implementation of neoliberal reforms. We pro-
ceed to focus on how these recent reforms have attempted
in both countries to constitute poor single mothers as ge-
neric workers, looking briefly at policies and in some detail
at the way women on welfare talk about the practices to
which they have been subjected. While all our respondents
report significant changes in those practices, most of which
have threatened to reduce their income, autonomy, and
self-esteem, their response to the changes is not one of total
despair or apathy. This prompts our concluding plea for
sensitivity to ethnographic and historical particularities in
the study of globalization, as against notions of its unidi-
rectional inevitability.
The Global Context of Welfare State Reform
Welfare reform does not just take place in nation-states
in isolation but in the larger context of nation-states' rela-
tionships with each other and with other transnational non-
state actors or forces (e.g., multinationals; international or-
ganizations such as the World Bank, the International
Monetary Fund, the International Labor Organization, and
the World Trade Organization; and international trade
agreements, such as the North American Free Trade
Agreement [NAFTA]). Welfare reform measures under-
taken in particular nation-states must therefore be situated
in the context of a global political and cultural economy.
Globalization, characterized as the increasing interna-
tionalization of economic and social phenomena, refers to
two interlinked processes: on the one hand, economic glo-
balization, or the "rapid growth of transactions and institu-
tions that are outside the older frameworks of inter-state re-
lations" (Sassen 1996a:9); and, on the other hand, the
globalization of culture, which refers to the increasing mo-
bility of people, ideas, and practices. Both processes indi-
cate that the sovereignty of the nation-state, in terms of its
ability to control what goes on materially and ideologically
within its territory, is not what it used to be and is in the
process of transformation—although no one is quite clear
as to the results of this transformation.
Both the United States and New Zealand have experi-
enced changes in recent decades reflective of their chang-
ing sovereignty in a global political-cultural economy.
Susser (1997:396) accordingly situates the 1996 U.S. Per-
sonal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act (PRWORA) in the context of a worldwide "expansion
of the industrial labor force" that targets women and is ac-
companied by a shift in gender expectations. What we now
find in the United States, she claims, is "an informational
economy, accompanied by enfeebled unions, less security
for most workers, a growing informal labor force, the
shrinking of the welfare state and increasing inequality"
(1997).
Several factors have also altered New Zealand's politi-
cal and economic relations with the "outside world" and
made it more open to external influences of the sort that
globalization theory highlights. First, with Britain's entry
into and growing commitment to the European Union, ac-
cess to the major market for the sorts of commodities that
New Zealand traditionally produced (meat, wool, and
dairy products) could no longer be taken for granted. Sec-
ond, the Australian and New Zealand labor and commod-
ity markets became much more integrated through the
creation of an arrangement known as the Closer Economic
Relationship (CER), thus exposing New Zealand to its
much larger neighbor. Third, the rise of the East Asian "ti-
ger" economies opened up new markets for new and tradi-
tional export products. Finally, and partly as a response to
these developments, New Zealand's own trade barriers
have been progressively dismantled, its economic and fi-
nancial sectors have been deregulated, and many state as-
sets have been sold to local and (especially) international
interests (Jesson 1987; see also Easton 1997,1999; Kelsey
1993,1997,1999).4
Thus, while we "should not exaggerate the degree to
which global forces overdetermine the fate of national
welfare states" (Esping-Andersen 1996:5), it is clear that
"global competition does narrow the field of domestic pol-
icy choice" (Esping-Andersen 1996:2). In addition, the
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"challenges" to the welfare state identified by Esping-
Andersen—changing economic conditions and demo-
graphic trends and a disjuncture between the current social
order and that for which the welfare state was designed
(Esping-Andersen 1996:6-9)—must themselves be situated
in a global context. The changing economic conditions to
which Esping-Andersen refers clearly occur in reference to
the changes in the international division of labor noted by
Susser (1997). In addition, shifts away from an ideal ho-
mogeneous population composed of similar nuclear-
family units reflect, at least in part, increasing tolerance for
heterogeneity and difference in household arrangements.
Paradoxically, this internal/domestic differentiation may
coexist with what is also deemed to be the inherent homog-
enization of globalism.
Neoliberalism
A key feature of both economic and cultural globaliza-
tion is the global spread of specifically neoliberal forms of
governance (e.g., Gill 1995; Teeple 1995), characterized
by an international and patterned shift in the direction of
increasing marketization, a redrawing of the public/private
distinction, valorization of possessive individualism, and
decreasing state expenditure (but sometimes, paradoxi-
cally, with increasing state interference) in social arenas.
Most notable in the case of welfare state restructuring in
countries like the United States and New Zealand is "a
strategy of deregulating wages and the labour market,
combined with a certain degree of welfare state erosion"
(Esping-Andersen 1996:10).
Neoliberalism is perhaps best conceived of as a cultural
system that makes certain claims about the economy, the
proper role of the state, and the nature of personhood that
in turn serve to organize society in highly gendered ways.5
Most significantly for our purposes here, neoliberal culture
depends on a theory of economic individualism (Lukes
1973). This entails a particular conceptualization of per-
sonhood, on the basis of which a unique vision of society is
constructed, namely, one with a minimalist state whose
role is simply to enable the free exchange of goods and
services between rational, independent individuals. As
Marcel Mauss pointed out in 1938, however, this philoso-
phy of individualism is both culturally specific—Western—
and of relatively recent historical origin (see [1938] 1985).
It is in this regard that La Fontaine makes a case for "rec-
ognition that concepts of the person are embedded in a so-
cial context" and are related to "a particular concept of so-
ciety as a whole" (1985.138, 137).
The general distinction anthropologists tend to make be-
tween the West and "the rest" with regard to ideas of per-
sonhood is between individualistic and sociocentric, or
"holistic," conceptions of personhood (Dumont 1980;
Morris 1994; see also Carrithers et al. 1985). Although
simplistic (Morris 1994), as a gross distinction it may per-
haps be useful. Geertz writes in this regard that
the Western conception of the person as a bounded, unique,
more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe a
dynamic center of awareness, emotion, judgment, and action
organized into a distinctive whole and set contrastively both
against other such wholes and against a social and natural
background is, however incorrigible it might seem to us, a
rather peculiar idea within the context of the world's cultures
[1975:48]
Neoliberalism, however, implicitly challenges the view
that personhood is socially and culturally constructed by
asserting that the autonomous and rational monad of West-
ern thought is natural and that any other versions of per-
sonhood are more ideological than cultural (Fairclough
1991; Rose 1989).
In addition, and as Western feminists have repeatedly
argued, the "individual" of liberal theory is not a generic
individual but a specifically male (and Anglo) individual
whose independent individuality is predicated on women's
dependence and subservience (Brown 1995; Pateman
1988, 1989). The latter is partially manifested in women's
circumscribed relationship to paid labor, which is con-
strained by their "private" duties and is constructed as sec-
ondary in importance to both their private responsibilities
and their men's public functioning. Women's resulting
status as secondary citizens and wage earners has had im-
plications, in turn, for their relationship to the state.
Whereas men in Western welfare states have made claims
against the state on the basis of their identities as public,
rights-bearing citizens, women's claims against the state
have usually been made on the basis of their identities as
private persons and dependent "clients" (Fraser 1989;
Pateman 1989).
At one level, neoliberalism overcomes the myriad prob-
lems associated with welfare states' characterization of
women as "dependents" and as recipients of "charity." In
its overvaluation of the "individual," neoliberalism works
to erase all negative and "undeserving" forms of depend-
ency, and, by pushing liberal feminism to its reductio ad
absurdum, invites women as well as men to participate in
this erasure. Thus "the 'sanctity of motherhood' no longer
shields women from the market; rather, a new vision of a
'gender-neutral worker-citizen' has emerged in proposals
to transform social assistance" (Scott 1996:8; see also
Brodie 1996; Shaver 1995). In addition, in the context of
economic globalization, such as that represented by
NAFTA and Closer Economic Relationship (CER), eco-
nomic citizenship, as a social right to economic well-being
and survival, is no longer the sole property of individuals
but one of firms and markets—of what Sassen refers to as
"global economic actors" (1996b:38). Nevertheless, wo-
men are being reconstituted as economic agents—as inde-
pendent, autonomous, rational decision makers and utility
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maximizers. That which falls outside of this realm— and
into the realm of reproduction and unpaid labor—is erased.
This erasure is purely nominal, however, with the conse-
quence that women are forced to continue in their "private"
responsibilities while simultaneously shouldering the bur-
dens of restructuring as they struggle to fill in the gaps left
by a retreating state. The reality of such women's "able-
bodiedness" is thus questionable.
History of Welfare Programs
Historically, the New Zealand and U.S. welfare states
have been situated at opposite ends of an individualist-col-
lectivist continuum. From the 1890s to the 1980s, most
New Zealanders and their governments espoused an ideol-
ogy of collectivism, in which the state was responsible for
the basic needs of its members. Indeed, New Zealand was
touted as a "cradle-to-grave" welfare state with "universal"
employment and "universal" coverage in areas such as
health and education. In contrast, U.S. history is marked by
an unabashed individualism, with the state taking a residu-
alist approach to welfare in most areas. Therefore, despite
the fact that in both cases it was the Great Depression of
the 1930s that precipitated the development of Social Se-
curity Acts (in 1935 in the United States and 1938 in New
Zealand), the acts themselves were different in three cru-
cial respects. First, in the United States, restrictive legisla-
tion rewarded higher earnings and protected "only a mi-
nority of the population against only a few risks," while the
New Zealand act, according to some historians, "covered
everybody against every risk, and redistributed income
downward" (Richards 1994:vii—viii). Second, whereas
New Zealand built its welfare state on a foundation of full
employment and the family wage, full employment never
featured in the organization of the U.S. welfare state. Fi-
nally, while the United States has drawn on both "contribu-
tory" and "noncontributory" funding, New Zealand has
tended to fund its programs from general revenues.
These fundamental differences in the underpinnings and
organization of welfare states are reflected in various ty-
pologies of welfare states. Thus the United States can be
characterized as a minimalist or needs-based regime, while
New Zealand could be characterized, until recently, as
closer to the other end of the spectrum: the social citizen-
ship/rights-based or institutional regime, in which people
are entitled to social services by virtue of being citizens
and in which assistance is designed to support participation
in society rather than just survival (Mishra 1977). In
Esping-Andersen's (1990) typology, the United States is a
liberal welfare state characterized by heavy means testing,
residual benefits, and private insurance, while New Zea-
land was social-democratic, characterized by universal
benefits and a commitment to full employment. As Sains-
bury (1996) points out, however, such ideal types fail to
capture the nuances of individual regimes and are thus
misleading. The United States, for instance, has both resid-
ual and institutional characteristics, as evidenced by its
two-tier system of social insurance on the one hand and
welfare on the other. New Zealand is similarly mixed, in
that a certain degree of means testing has always existed
alongside universal programs. Any particular categoriza-
tion of welfare state regimes must also recognize historical
fluctuations.
In addition, Sainsbury continues, welfare state typolo-
gies are often of limited use in relation to the experiences
of different segments of the population within particular
welfare regimes. This is clearly the case in the United
States and New Zealand with regard to poor single moth-
ers. Specifically, when gender and race are included in the
analysis, the United States and New Zealand no longer ap-
pear at opposite ends of a residualist, rights-based contin-
uum but, rather, seem to have approached poor single
mothers in remarkably similar ways. First, given New Zea-
land's emphasis on full employment as the foundation of
its welfare state (resulting in its characterization as a
"wage-earners" welfare state [Castles 1996]), those who
were outside the labor force never fared as well. Thus the
New Zealand Social Security Act did not, in fact, cover
"everybody against every risk" (Richards 1994: viii) but
excluded many women and Maori. The "everybody" cov-
ered was European and male. In this context, "undeserv-
ing," morally suspect women—non-Europeans, nonwid-
ows—had difficulty gaining state support. In fact, no
specific provisions were made for unmarried mothers until
1973 (Beaglehole 1993). Prior to this, such women had to
get either an "emergency benefit" or be placed on a
widow's or deserted wife's benefit, despite the fact that
they were neither; in other words, they had to be trans-
ferred from an "undeserving" to a "deserving" category of
poor (although deserted wives were never as "deserving"
as widows and often had difficulty gaining access to sup-
port). Thus, in New Zealand, "the plight of single mothers
before the introduction of the Domestic Purposes Benefit
(DPB) was characterised by poverty, dependence and
powerlessness" (Beaglehole 1993:30). A similar pattern
existed in the United States, where, prior to the 1935 Social
Security Act, the only program available to single mothers
was Mothers' Pensions, which supported white widows to
the exclusion of most other women (see Kingfisher 1999).
Prereform Welfare Programs in New Zealand
and the United States
The main program for poor single mothers in New Zea-
land has been the Domestic Purposes Benefit, which, as its
name implies, was designed to support single parents (usu-
ally mothers) in their roles as caretakers for dependent
children. The DPB was introduced in 1973, in the midst of
furious debate concerning women's sexuality. This late in-
troduction stems from an ambivalence in New Zealand
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culture concerning single mothers. Once introduced, how-
ever, the DPB was relatively generous, providing single
mothers with the option of staying out of the workforce un-
til their youngest child was 18. Until the reforms of the
early 1990s, the DPB was more or less stable, reflecting a
general comfort with a gendered division of labor in which
women's primary role was that of mother (although moth-
ers on the DPB were generally deemed less respectable
than their married counterparts).
The comparable program in the United States has been
AFDC (Aid to Families with Dependent Children). Fol-
lowing Mothers' Pensions, which were instituted in a
number of states beginning in 1911, AFDC was enacted in
1935 with the passage of the Social Security Act. Origi-
nally known as Aid to Dependent Children, or ADC, indi-
cating that provisions were being directed to children
rather than mothers (although mothers were conduits for
provisioning), coverage for mothers was introduced in
1950, and coverage for unemployed parents was intro-
duced in 1961. Finally, in 1962 ADC was renamed AFDC
to reflect a targeting of families rather than of individual
children.6
Both AFDC and the DPB were intended to cover poor
families' basic needs, including shelter, utilities, and per-
sonal needs. In New Zealand the DPB also covers food ex-
penses, while in the U.S. food expenses have been met by
Food Stamps, a separate program providing food coupons
on a monthly basis. Finally, in New Zealand, health care
has been provided by an ostensibly universal system of
health care provision, with the poor having access to the
same system as the rest of the population; while in the
United States, health care for some of the poor has been
provided through the Medicaid program.
Although instituted at different times, and articulating
differently with the welfare states of which they are a part,7
AFDC and the DPB have served the same population of
mostly women single parents and their children and have
shared a history of similar treatment of that population.
Two features of this treatment are notable. The first is the
surveillance of women to ensure either that they had no
male partners or, if they did, that the women were
promptly removed from the welfare rolls. In the United
States, this was accomplished by means of "man in the
house" rules, which gave welfare workers the right to visit
recipients' homes, often unannounced and at odd times, in
order to check for evidence of adult male presence. Similar
practices existed in New Zealand. A second similarity in
the two programs is that benefits have been discontinued
once children have reached adulthood, providing poor
women with aid in their capacities as mothers rather than
by virtue of their poverty.
Surveillance and the conditionality of benefits indicate
that AFDC and the DPB assumed and reinforced a con-
struction of women as mothers. If not in the service of hus-
bands, they could be in the service of the state. But they
could not be in the service of both simultaneously. And
once this service was discontinued—once they were no
longer engaged in the rearing of children—their benefits
were discontinued as well.
The Reforms
AFDC and the DPB also had their positive side, how-
ever. Both programs took the first step toward allowing
women to be treated as economically independent persons,
thus giving them the means to leave abusive relationships
or, in the case of never-partnered women in New Zealand,
to keep their children, as opposed to having to adopt them
out (Beaglehole 1993). In one sense, the new reforms per-
vert this by demanding "independence" through the trans-
formation of poor bodies into work-ready labor units.
In addition to the general historical similarities outlined
above, there are remarkable parallels in the nature of the
reforms currently being proposed and instituted in the
realm of policy provisions for poor single mothers in New
Zealand and the United States,8 the most notable being
"workfare" provisions that endeavor to reconstitute poor
mothers as able-bodied workers.9 The programmatic simi-
larities between the two countries are discursively mir-
rored in official and popular arguments for benefit cuts and
workfare, which have been made on the basis of the mutu-
ally supporting claims that "we" (the taxpayers) can no
longer afford to support the poor and that welfare "disem-
powers" recipients, who are thereby rendered lazy, de-
pendent, and irresponsible. In both contexts, the resulting
benefit cuts and work tests have been referred to as "tough
love," the end result of which will be "empowered," "re-
sponsible," "independent," "contributing" members of so-
ciety (Kingfisher 1999).
The trend in the United States in the past 20 years-
manifested in the 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act (OBRA),10 the 1988 Family Support Act,11 and the
1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Rec-
onciliation Act (PRWORA)12—is one of decreasing fed-
eral control (which can be important in terms of rights and
benefit levels) and increased institutionalization of work-
fare. Significantly, these shifts are occurring in the face of
a decreasing value of the benefit and in a context in which
minimum-wage jobs fail to provide for basic subsistence.13
Though New Zealand is clearly following the United
States in terms of benefit cuts and workfare, the latter is not
quite the same as workfare in the United States. While the
1996 U.S. welfare reform bill requires recipients to engage
in work-related activity after they have been on assistance
for two years, the 1997 changes in the New Zealand wel-
fare system only require that mothers seek part-time em-
ployment once their youngest child reaches the age of 14.
This difference may reflect the relatively greater recogni-
tion of mothering as "work" in the New Zealand context.
Thus, while New Zealand is keeping up with the United
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States in terms of promoting the idea of workfare, it is far
behind in its institutionalization.14
There have been two recent phases of welfare reform in
New Zealand relevant to our discussion here (Stephens
1999). First, in spring 1991, the newly elected National
government instituted a number of changes in the welfare
state that reflected a shift from universal to targeted provi-
sioning (Boston et al. 1999), underpinned by an individual-
ist rather than collectivist approach, and employed an
absolute rather than relative definition of poverty (Walde-
grave and Frater 1996).15 The second phase of reform in
New Zealand began with the 1996 Tax Reduction and
Social Policy Bill. This involved two changes to the DPB,
effective April 1, 1997. First, recipients whose youngest
child was between the ages of 7 and 13 were now required
to attend a yearly interview with Income Support Services
that would "signal to beneficiaries that they should be tak-
ing steps to move towards independence and employment
and provide appropriate advice to help them do this" (New
Zealand Finance and Expenditure Committee 1996:viii);
and second, recipients whose youngest child was 14 years
of age or more would be subjected to a work test, including
the requirement that they be in training, seeking paid em-
ployment, or in paid employment for 15 hours per week.
The penalties for failing to fulfill these requirements take
the form of benefit reductions.16 In addition to these legis-
lative changes, in 1998 New Zealand Income Support and
Employment New Zealand merged to form Work and In-
come New Zealand (WINZ). Two years later WINZ's dis-
mal public reputation, stemming from accusations of ex-
travagance and a private sector corporate ethos, led to
another name change—Department of Work and Income—
but, crucially, the relabeling exercise did not separate the
two key nouns.
From (Gendered) Mother to (Generic) Worker
Arguments in favor of welfare reform rest on particular
constructions of personhood and citizenship, the ascen-
dancy of which signal a shift in the relationship between
poor women and state provision. If feminism has struggled
with the contradictions between the welfare state's con-
struction of women as mothers and dependents (and thus
as secondary citizens) and its contribution to women's in-
dependence from abusive relationships with men, neolib-
eralism has responded to these struggles and critiques by
"degendering" individuals' relationships to state provision.
Now women, too, can be counted as separate, autonomous
"individuals" whose very individuality provides them with
the means to achieve self-sufficiency.
Poor mothers, however, fail to fulfill the requirements of
full individuality and autonomy and, thus, of citizenship.
But this "failure" is not constituted as one of a particular
political or economic system; nor is it seen to be a feature
of a gender regime that produces male citizens and incom-
plete dependent women. Rather, the failure is attributed to
women themselves, who are always already incomplete
and dependent. The result is that poverty policy is directed
at the reformation of individuals rather than structures:
thus the rhetoric of empowerment, motivation, and "tough
love." As federal programs are devolved to states, "welfare
dependency" is devolved to individuals and pathologized.
Thus, the disadvantaged, the marginalized, "are to be as-
sisted not through the ministrations of solicitous experts
proffering support and benefit cheques, but through their
engagement in a whole array of programmes for their ethi-
cal reconstruction as active citizens" (Rose 1996:59-60;
see also Kingfisher 2001).
Insofar as poverty is constituted as a reflection of an in-
dividual, feminized, and racialized incapacity, the re-
sponses of the neoliberal state are channeled in two spe-
cific directions, which we can refer to as residualist
(Sainsbury 1996) and incentivist. The first is the route of
outright cuts, including benefit reductions and limitations,
restrictions on eligibility, and increased targeting and
means testing. This route is particularly attractive if the ex-
istence of the poor is constituted as reflective of an indi-
vidualized incapacity that is perhaps not only inherent but
specifically enhanced by welfare programs that have en-
couraged dependency and parasitic behavior. In other
words, if freedom requires the absence (or at least the mini-
mization) of interference—what is known in liberal theory
as negative liberty (Ramsay 1997)—then welfare provi-
sions undermine recipients' liberty, as well as the liberty of
taxpayers who are forced to contribute to welfare pro-
grams.
The incentivist route to reform draws on a more positive
version of freedom in recognizing that freedom requires
the resources necessary to pursue one's own individual
ends (Ramsay 1997). In this case, the state is seen as re-
sponsible for providing some of these resources. But the
resources it provides must be of a very particular nature if
the result is not to be a disabling, disempowering interfer-
ence. Specifically, the resources provided must be de-
signed so as to enhance the individual's abilities to exercise
freedom, that is, autonomy, self-sufficiency, and inde-
pendence. So-called incentive programs, which are highly
interventionist, punitive, and in many respects illiberal, re-
sult from this position. Sanctions for children's nonatten-
dance at school and for out-of-wedlock births and lifetime
limits on the receipt of benefits (in the U.S. case) are con-
stituted as appropriate "incentives" in this framework.
Again, however, most notable in this context is workfare.
"Work," as Foucault (1979:242) quotes Faucher (1838), is
"the providence of the modern peoples; it replaces moral-
ity, fills the gaps left by beliefs and is regarded as the prin-
ciple of all good." Workfare, in this regard, functions "as a
means of promoting the personal capacities required for
the exercise of autonomy" (Hindess 1997:25), positively
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contributing to poor people's "ethical reconstruction as ac-
tive citizens" (Rose 1996:60).17
With the help of the disciplinary measures of cuts and
so-called incentives, poor single mothers are being recon-
stituted as potential able-bodied workers while their for-
mer identities as mothers and dependent housewives (Mies
1986) take on increasingly negative salience. The move is
one from dependence to enterprise, the latter characterized
by a valorization not only of "autonomy, responsibility, in-
itiative, self-reliance, [and] independence" but also of "a
willingness to take risks, see opportunities, and take re-
sponsibility for one's own actions" (Cannan 1995:162).
With their reconstitution as enterprising subjects, poor
women are being compelled to enter the public realm to an
even greater extent than previously (since many already
combine welfare with low-wage labor, if not under-the-ta-
ble work). Despite this increasing material and discursive
movement of women into the public realm, however,
women do not enter it as equal citizens, as the dearth of ef-
fective equality legislation indicates (Sainsbury 1996). Si-
multaneously, moreover, privatization of state welfare pro-
visions is contributing to an expansion of the realm of
private welfare, for which women continue to be held re-
sponsible.
The end results of the reforms have thus been a mixture
of the intended and the unintended, the logical and the per-
verse. They are designed to reconstitute (poor) women as
potential able-bodied workers and in this they appear to be
succeeding, though not without some resistance on the part
of poor women and their political allies. They are probably
not intentionally designed to erase (unpaid) child care, but
because that is not treated as "work" in policy settings,
they are placing such labor under huge pressure. Finally,
while they are not explicitly designed to devalue (poor)
women's roles as mothers—because any policy that
overtly demeans motherhood carries political risks—they
do so in practice.
Ethnographic Dimensions of Welfare Reform
As Appadurai states, "If the genealogy of cultural forms
is about their circulation across regions, the history of these
forms is about their ongoing domestication into local prac-
tice" (1996:17). Relatedly, Sassen (1996a, 1996b) proble-
matizes global-local/national dualisms that assume that
one ends where the other begins. Instead, she asserts, we
need to recognize that all global processes are territorially
situated—in other words, that the global is always, and
only, manifested in local specificities.
These insights generate a number of questions with re-
gard to gender, poverty, and welfare reform, which we ad-
dress here in relation to the experiences of poor single
mothers.18 For instance, what shape does neoliberal reform
take in welfare states with a history of universal provisions
versus those characterized as minimalist or residualist? Do
the discursive similarities among sites—the ubiquity of the
rhetoric of independence, responsibility, motivation, self-
discipline, and, of course, "tough love"—signal precise
similarities in reform policy as it is instantiated? Or are "in-
dependence" and "tough love" refracted through different
local lenses, resulting in a proliferation of family resem-
blances rather than exact replicas—or possibly in radically
divergent practices? We need to be careful, in other words,
"not to confuse similarity with convergence" (Cox 1998:13).
Methods
This article is based on several different research strands
conducted over a number of years, both formal and infor-
mal. Over the last 10 to 15 years, both authors have com-
piled large amounts of documentary and historical data on
changing welfare regimes in the United States and New
Zealand, data that serve to contextualize the ethnographic
research presented here. In the United States, Kingfisher
conducted an ethnographic study of women welfare work-
ers and recipients in Michigan in 1989 and 1990 (King-
fisher 1996a, 1996b, 1998, 2001). The recipient data in-
cluded in this article are drawn from her work with
members of two welfare rights group, the Madrid Welfare
Rights Organization (MWRO) and Low Income People
for Equality (LIFE).19 In both cases, emphasis was placed
on the collection of naturally occurring talk, which was
then subjected to content and conversation analysis; indi-
vidual interviews with core welfare rights group members
were also conducted. Previously unreported material from
that project is included in this article.
It is worth pointing out that the 1996 U.S. act, which
serves as one focus of this article, was the culmination of
trends put into place by OBRA in 1981 and the Family
Support Act in 1988; thus efforts to reconstitute women's
subjectivity were well under way during the time of King-
fisher's 1989-90 study. In specific relation to this (recon-
stitution, what has happened since then represents an inten-
sification rather than an entirely new direction.
Our analysis of the situation of poor single mothers in
New Zealand draws from both individual and team re-
search that combined interviewing, the analysis of policy
documents and media coverage, and intermittent ethno-
graphic research, some of it quite informal. First, King-
fisher conducted a study of the discourse of policy making
in New Zealand from 1994 to 1998 (Kingfisher 1999); the
results of this work have contributed to our understanding
of how the New Zealand government has been working to
reconstitute poor single mothers' subjectivity. Second,
Goldsmith has carried out small-scale ethnographic re-
search on beneficiaries in New Zealand (Goldsmith 2000)
and has a long-standing interest in welfare institutional de-
sign and reform (Goldsmith 1997a, 1997b). Third, work-
ing as a team, we conducted a series of interviews and
focus groups in Hamilton, New Zealand, in early 1999,
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which were animated by the concerns directly addressed in
this article. While small in relation to the data corpus from
Kingfisher's U.S. study (which produced over 240 hours
of audio tape), the data produced from the five interviews
and one focus group we conducted for the purposes of this
article are nevertheless robust and oriented specifically to
the issue of poor women's subjectivity. The latter data
must also be situated in the context of the many informal
conversations that both authors have had with numerous
women on the DPB, over the last 15 years in Goldsmith's
case and over the last 6 years in Kingfisher's. We believe
that this informal work compensates for the relatively
smaller amount of "official" data on New Zealand. And al-
though the data are not strictly comparable by date, we be-
lieve that they speak to ongoing reform trends in both
countries.
The women whose talk is analyzed in this article ranged
in age from 19 to 48. Each had at least one child; one had
four children, and another had five children. They had been
on the welfare rolls from between 18 months and 17 years
(those who had relationships with the welfare system for
long periods in the United States tended to go on and off
the rolls, depending on job opportunities and relationships
with income-earning men). Two of the U.S. and one of the
New Zealand women had never been married; the rest of
the New Zealand women had been married once, while the
remaining U.S. women had been married from one to three
times. Three of the U.S. and one of the New Zealand
women were currently cohabiting with men. All of the
U.S. women and five of the New Zealand women had par-
ticipated in paid employment. Finally, all of the U.S.
women are Anglo, while of our New Zealand participants
mentioned in this article, two are Maori and three Pakeha.
Experiencing the Reforms in the United States
The poor single mothers in the United States were
acutely aware of the dominant ideology of the work ethic
and its flip side, the stereotype of laziness. As indicated
elsewhere (Kingfisher 1996a, 1996b), the women coun-
tered their identification as "lazy welfare queens" by
means of a twofold process consisting of repeated asser-
tions of allegiance to the work ethic and attributions of
laziness to a minority of other recipients.20
This assertion of an identity in keeping with dominant
views of personhood and enterprising independence, how-
ever, was coupled with an equally strong assertion that
they were being actively prevented from fulfilling the
work ethic (and thus acquiring full personhood). Signifi-
cantly, they claimed that the site of such prevention did not
reside in themselves, as dominant views of the "lazy poor"
claim, but in the welfare system and, more broadly, in soci-
ety at large.
Thus, while accepting the work ethic as a positive value,
and accommodating dominant definitions of work as paid
work, the women argued that their individual efforts were
not sufficient and that therefore they could not be blamed
as individuals. As Susan Harrison put it, bluntly:
I worked my ass off, that's why I got a bad back now at the
age of 33, because I have worked so hard thinking that was
the way you had to go, you know, to make something of your-
self, which is a bum-fuck lie. [LIFE, 8/19/90]
The reason the idea of working hard to "make something
of yourself is a "bum-fuck lie" is that neither the world of
work nor the welfare system is set up to meet the needs of
single working mothers. This view was perhaps most elo-
quently expressed by Louise Black, who responded to the
suggestion by a welfare rights participant that women who
bear more than three children while on the welfare rolls be
forced to have tubal ligations by arguing that the problem
is not women's bodies but divorce, unemployment, and the
wage gap. Louise made this argument in the context of an
MWRO meeting, the relevant excerpt of which follows.
Participants in the following transcript segment from the
meeting included Nora Philips (N), Susan Harrison (S),
and Louise (L) (note that capital letters indicate emphatic
delivery, parentheses bind uncertain or undecipherable
words, and double parentheses bind nonverbal vocaliza-
tions/activities or transcriber's comments).
Transcript #1: "What do ya wanna be when you grow
up?"
1 k MOST of the time we're on welfare and MOST of the peo-
2 pie who are on welfare are out there WORKING most of
3 the time, NObody's gonna tell me I can't have any kids
4 because I happen to be on welfare for a little bit of time
5 N: no
6 L Nobody's gonna tell me because I happen to have a
7 divorce that THEY'RE GONNA DO SOMETHING TO
8 MY BODY SO I CAN'T HAVE BABIES, uh uh, uh uh,
9 that's CRAZY, you know?
10 N: I mean, that's what they want with, that's what they think
11 they should do
12 L SURE, they think somehow, they . . . spread this stuff that
13 you know people are born—
14 N: we're no good
15 L: and they say, they go to school and they say "what do ya
16 wanna be when you grow up," say "I wanna be on
17 WELFARE, have FOUR HUNDRED KIDS" you know?
18 S: that's it, that's it, yeah
19 L- and, so they say "well, there's this whole GROUP of
20 people that wanna just BE on welfare and have babies and
21 we have to STOP them before they take over the
22 WORLD," THAT'S just a BUNCH a SHIT
23 S: yeah, but you know what?
24 L people are o n . . . welfare because there AINT no jobs,
25 because they're gettin... DIVORCED and because they pay
26 women 50 cents on a DOLLAR for what they men, and
27 we're the ones that always have the babies
[MWRO, 4/4/90, side 1, segment 20.41-21.34]
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Louise's claim, is, first of all, that most people on welfare
"are out there WORKING" most of the time that they are
on welfare (lines 1-2). The reason that people are on wel-
fare therefore has nothing to do with their own motivation
to work. That is not at issue. What is at issue is the context
within which they are working, and that context is charac-
terized by high rates of unemployment (line 24) and by low
levels of pay for women (lines 25-26), who are, after all,
"the ones that always have the babies" (line 27) and there-
fore the ones who usually end up on the welfare rolls after
they have been divorced. In Louise's construction, the
typical welfare mother (of which she is representative) is
someone who was married—and therefore had her chil-
dren legitimately—and who then got in financial trouble
because she got divorced and either could not find a job at
all or found only jobs that paid too little to meet the basic
subsistence needs of her family. In this formulation, what
needs controlling is the economy, not women's bodies.
As the following transcript segment indicates, the
women's efforts to repair their "spoiled identities" (Goff-
man 1963) revolved around this constellation of expres-
sions of the aspiration to paid work, claims that paid work
did not allow them to fulfill their family responsibilities,
and assertions of the importance of motherhood. The ex-
change took place in the context of a LIFE meeting; par-
ticipants included Susan Harrison (S), Dana Kingston (D),
and Susan's boyfriend Tom Harris (T):
Transcript #2: "circumstances HAPPEN"
1 S: I had my kids before I ever SEEN WELfare, you know
2 T: that's right
3 S: circumstances HAPPEN
4 D: I was married when I had my kids... I never THOUGHT Td
5 be on welfare
6 S: so was I ((laughs)) you know, but that's the way they
7 THINK, they think if you have kids, you're... like they are,
8 you goin' to school 'til you're 28 or whatever,
9 you got your job you got your career, and that's the way it
10 SHOULD be, but that's not the way it is
11 D: no ( ) work very well, I didn't (go to work) not until my
12 kids were in school
13 S: I, I wanted a career, but my situation was a little bit
14 different
15 D: I did TOO, but. . . not 'til my kids were in SCHOOL, I mean
16 'cause otherwise—
17 S: WELL WHY SHOULD A MOTHER HAVE TO GO OUT
18 AND WORK ANYWAY? WHY SHOULD SHE, when,
19 the first five years is so important to 'em, and I mean they
20 got peoples PROFESSORS, or DOCTORS in their FIELD
21 sayin' it, you know? A CHILD needs to be lo— with their
22 mother for the first years, or fathers, whichever the case
23 may be, whichever the BEST parent is, you know
[LIFE, 8/19/90, tape 1, side B, segment 32.48-33.52]
As Louise Black claimed in U.S. transcript #1 with regard
to most recipients, Susan and Dana were mothers—and
married—before they became welfare mothers (lines 1 and
4). In addition, both women had wanted "careers" (lines
13-15). But—and this is the key—they were not interested
in engaging in paid work until their children were of school
age. Dana makes this point twice (at lines 11-12 and 15),
in response to which Susan emphatically declares "WELL
WHY SHOULD A MOTHER HAVE TO GO OUT AND
WORK ANYWAY? WHY SHOULD SHE, when, the
first five years is so important to 'em" (lines 17-19). What
is being produced in this exchange is an assertion of moth-
ering as women's primary role. And Susan and Dana are
not the only people who believe this—the experts believe it
too (lines 20-21). Thus the women's assertion of belief in
the work ethic is modified to claim that the pursuit of paid
work must be delayed until children reach a certain age, in
this case, school age. This desire to delay engaging in paid
work until children were in school was further justified by
the fact that the employment the women had access to was
poorly paid. If they could be in paid labor and make ends
meet, they would be happy to do so, but if not, they would
rather spend the time with their children. Again, while this
line of thought gives some indication of agreement with
the work ethic, it comes with the stipulation that pay levels
be sufficient to meet one's basic subsistence needs, which
in the women's case meant their children's needs as well as
their own. If the women were to be "workers," then, they
were workers of a particular sort, that is, tied into family
units. As such, they required a version of the "family
wage," which would provide both recognition and material
support for their roles as primary breadwinners.21
Because it was so difficult to be a single working
mother, the women sometimes contemplated life without
their children. It was never a pleasant contemplation, how-
ever, even under the best of circumstances. And the result
of such contemplations always led back to reflection on the
deficiencies of the social-economic system, in particular,
those related to the roles and responsibilities of fathers, as
the next transcript excerpt indicates:
Transcript #3: "why are they getting AWAY with it?"
If women were "natural" caretakers of babies and chil-
dren, then men were "natural" providers of financial sup-
port. Thus, in addition to arguing against workfare and in
favor of being able to fulfill their roles as primary caretak-
ers, the women asserted that fathers, too, should be held re-
sponsible for children. This view was expressed in the fol-
lowing exchange, in which Katie Devon (K), Susan
Harrison (S), and myself (C) responded to a television pro-
gram that had outlined punitive welfare policies directed at
single mothers:
1 K: that REALLY bothers me, you g o . . . to the STORE with
2 FOOD stamps, and you get some MAN standing behind
3 you looking at you like you're trash
4 S: mm huh
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5 K: you know, I mean I've had people even make
6 COMMENTS, you know, I've turned around and said, you
7 know, to some guy, "how many babies aren't YOU paying
8 for right now?"
9 C: oohhhh
10 K: you know, and he just SHUT UP
11 S: that's it
12 K: you know, just like ((laughs))
13 S: but I think, you know, if they're gonna make us WOMEN
14 do it, they better damn site put the damn cuffs on those
15 guys and make them do the same thing, because this is
16 ridiculous, why make the women and the children suffer
17 and the man's just slapped on the HAND?
18 K: if you get ( ) if we could GET child support from our
19 spouses and the fathers of our children, then we could make
20 it, that's what I see
21 S: yeah, that IS true
22 K: if I could get help
23 S: BUT, the FATHERS is having the same problems as WE
24 are because there's no jobs out there, they don't have the
25 training for the jobs
26 K: right
27 S: but why are they getting AWAY with it, why not stick their
28 asses in the same school they got us goin' to, it takes two
29 people to make a baby, it's gonna take two people to pull
30 that baby through, not just one
[MWRO 5/20/90, tape 1, side 1, segment 27.33-28.33]
This exchange demonstrates the intersections of the
women's resistance to the impositions of the welfare sys-
tem with both neoliberal discourses of individual responsi-
bility and neoconservative discourses of family values.
The women assert fathers' specific responsibilities toward
their children (lines 7-8 and 28-30), claiming that if fa-
thers were more responsible, "then we could make it"
(lines 18-20). Interestingly, rather than contest the exist-
ence of punitive policies, here the women work to extend
them to include fathers in their purview (lines 13-15 and
21-2S).22
In sum, themes in the U.S. data include acquiescence to
the idea of the work ethic—and thus claims to full person-
hood and citizenship—with provisos that recognize
women's primary role as caretakers of young children: suf-
ficient support in the form of either wages, child care pro-
visions or contributions from fathers, along with exemp-
tion from paid labor until children reach school age. As we
demonstrate in the following section, the themes in the
New Zealand data are somewhat different, which may re-
flect both cultural and historical factors.
Experiencing the Reforms in New Zealand
During the almost 20-year period from 1973, when the
DPB was instituted, to 1991, when neoliberal reform be-
gan to be put into place, poor single mothers in New Zea-
land received comparatively generous support from the
state. This feeling of being supported as mothers was ech-
oed by the women we spoke with, many of whom have ex-
perienced the recent shift in the government's definition of
women as mothers to an emphasis on all adults as potential
able-bodied workers.
This shift in identity has been both recent and radical.
Evelyn Haines made this clear when she described the dif-
ficulties involved in convincing the welfare system to pro-
vide assistance for child care as recently as 1996, just prior
to the implementation of the Tax Reduction and Social
Policy Bill:
When I came to Kotari . . . ((in)) '96 . . . that ((pursuing a uni-
versity degree)) was still quite surprising . . . ((and the worker
said)) "you're going to do all t h i s? . . . wow, you're pushing it.
. . . Why aren't you just at home and play((ing)) with your
child?" because she was only four. And I tried to get them to
pay for child care ((so I could attend university and get off the
D P B ) ) . . . ((but)) there was very little money for that because
it was not in their system that someone would do that, [inter-
view, 2/15/99]
The emphasis at the time was still clearly on mothering.
But the 1996 Tax Reduction and Social Policy Bill marked
a change in emphasis. As Kathy Fletcher lamented in a fo-
cus group discussion, "I think the reality today for . . . solo
parents is that the . . . focus is not on the children, it's now
about becoming . . . entrenched in the workforce" (focus
group, 2/19/99). This situation, characterized by an empha-
sis on getting a job, contrasts sharply with Kathy's first ex-
perience of being a solo parent on welfare in 1981, when
she was "offered a house . . . a benefit . . . everything I
needed to fill the house, whatever I wanted so that I could
be a good mother" (Focus group, 2/19/99):
Transcript #1: "your children don't matter anymore"
Formerly quite prominent, then—certainly more so than
in the United States since at least OBRA in 1981—the em-
phasis on women as mothers is now no longer in evidence
in New Zealand. In the following focus group exchange,
three single mothers and two single fathers had been dis-
cussing "muck-ups" (i.e., bureaucratic errors for which re-
cipients always paid the price). Tara Taniwha (T) then re-
ferred back to a comment that Kathy Fletcher (K) had
made earlier, to the effect that women used to be supported
as mothers but were no longer. Other participants in the ex-
change included Sam Hill (S) and Catherine Kingfisher
(Q:
1 T: they, they were there to SUPPORT they were a big help,
2 NOW, THESE days it's like your children don't matter
3 anymore and you've got parents that's got handicapped
4 kids you know THAT doesn't matter anymore
5 S: that's very hard for them to look after those handicapped
6 kids
7 T: and you've got ( ) mothers, and they've got to go, too,
8 nobody really matters anymore that's what the main you
9 know issue is about today, once upon a time you know
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10 you've got to look after your kids, once upon a time
11 S: yeah
12 C: miran
13 T: NOW it's "you better get OUT there"—I dunno, I'm NOT
14 quite too SURE because my kids are grown up but I know
15 for the little ones whether they help you pay I don't know
16 whether they're offering, you go to work and they help you
17 to pay you
18 K: child—yeah, partial childcare subsidy
19 T: I'm not too sure
20 K- but I think the MAIN issue that that a lot of us are trying to
21 (mainly) concerned with is that on the one hand you've still
22 got . . . a real drive for the PLUNKET... Karitane ((child care
23 organizations)), everything to do with. . . CARE and then on
24 the OTHER hand, it's real—REALLY confusing because
25 your heart goes with, "ok, I'll give everything up and stay
26 home with my CHILDREN" knowing full well that you've
27 gotta get the ASSISTANCE, because there's also the other
28 half of us that's HUMAN, we WANT things, we want to
29 DO things
[Focus group 1,2/19/99, tape 1, side 1, segment 18.3&-20.07]
Tara is clear about the shift in emphasis at Income Support
from children and caretaking to paid employment: once,
"they were there to SUPPORT they were a big help,
NOW, THESE days it's like your children don't matter
anymore" (lines 1-3); "NOW," she repeats a moment later,
"it's 'you better get OUT there' " (line 13), meaning out in
the workforce. Kathy then points to the conflicting mes-
sages present in New Zealand society; on the one hand, the
goal of various family advocate groups such as Plunket—
also funded (partially, and decreasingly so) by the govern-
ment—which stress "mothercraft" and children's need for
positive and stable home environments, and, on the other
hand, the temptations of consumer culture, which are un-
derscored by a welfare system that now emphasizes not
family life but work life, not taking care of children but
taking care of finances, not making a life but making a liv-
ing:
Transcript #2: "we've got more suicide rate than
ANY where in the world"
The women saw this declining emphasis on mothering
as dangerous: families were falling apart because they did
not get enough time together and because parents were
stretched beyond their limits; children were suffering the
consequences of insufficient and inadequate attention and
guidance from adults. In the following exchange, Sam Hill
(S), a single father, had been describing WINZ's expecta-
tions that he participate in full-time training, when Tara
Taniwha (T) asserted that children cannot thrive without
adult guidance:
1 T: and who's home for the kids—you're too TIRED
2 S: yes
3 T: you're too tired for the kids
4 S: that's, that's the other thing is when you're gonna do your
5 washing and so on
6 T: and . . . TODAY, in New ZEALAND, we've got more suicide
7 rate, than ANYwhere in the world because of the pressure I
8 mean it's like a mother and father instincts, your—you
9 know your FAMILY comes—your kids if they're small
10 they come first before the job ( ) you've got to feed them,
11 they gotta come first
12 S: well the only thing that Social Welfare—
13 T: but there's there's nothing now 'cause everyone's so
14 DRAINED, and being a solo PARENT I reckon you know
15 being a solo parent, is, that we're the strong people of
16 ALL
17 S: because ( )—
18 C: miran
19 T: we've got to take on KIDS and when our little ones grow
20 up an d when they're TEENagers, it's wicked to live with a
21 teenager now
[Focus group 1,2/19/99, tape 1, side 1, segment 8.27-29.04]
The social costs of poorly looked-after children are clear:
New Zealand now has a higher youth suicide rate than any
other country in the world, "because of the pressure" (line
7). What the welfare system is forgetting in its push for
employment is that parenting is work—that it takes a lot of
time, effort, and skill—and that its absence will have a
negative impact on children. Tara claimed in this regard
that single parents, who are responsible for meeting chil-
dren's financial as well as parenting needs, are "the
strong((est)) people of ALL" (lines 15-16). While the U.S.
women also made the claim that mothers' employment
could have dire consequences for children (transcript #2;
also Kingfisher 1996a), they focused for the most part on
the mothering of young children, usually children under
the age of five. In New Zealand, in contrast, emphasis was
placed on the need for adult guidance until children were
safely through their teens. As Tara put it later in the discus-
sion, "I believe at those ages—13, 14, and 15—at those
ages I believe they need you the MOST 'cause their body's
changing and their mind's changing, everything's chang-
ing." Another participant felt that even a 20 year old was
"still immature ((because)) they've just got out of their
teenage years" (focus group, 2/19/99):
Transcript #3: "they don't really want to know
about it"
The welfare system's change in focus from women as
mothers to women as workers was not only abrupt but also,
from the women's perspective, total, such that children
were now invisible to the system. Vicky Soul (V), for in-
stance, decided to take university courses as opposed to
seeking employment while on the DPB so that she could
have the flexibility to be with her children when they
needed her. As the following interview excerpt indicates,
however, WINZ did not consider parenting the priority:
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V: My priority is Jane and Amanda... my children. I had to be
there As a single parent I would not have been able to
cope with full-time work because study enabled me to juggle
my family They've ((the children)) just benefited from it
and developed... they're very strong little girls now and I'm
pleased that I put the time into them.
C: Do you think Income Support shared that view—that, you
know, your primary role was to be there for the twins?
V: No, no, not at all, not at all if s ((parenting)) not acknowl-
edged at all, nothing has ever been discussed about the girls,
nothing, they've never ever asked after the health of my chil-
dren or, you know, ever
C: Realty? In the whole six years ((that you've been on the
DPB))?
V: No, nothing, nothing whatsoever . . . even when Fve been in
and I've been financially so stressed, they're not very inter-
ested, they don't really care, it's like, so is the rest of the
world, so they don't really want to know about it [interview,
2/17/99]
Tracy Fredericks also claimed "I don't get the feeling . . .
that they want me to raise my child well" (interview,
2/22/99), and a number of women pointed out that welfare
offices had no toys to keep children occupied during the
usually long waits. Rather, WINZ was concerned with
"goal-setting meetings" (mentioned by three interviewees)
and with recipients' efforts to "better themselves," the lat-
ter having to do with work-readiness training, not mother-
ing. As Diane Bould put it, "Obviously just being a mother
wasn't enough as far as they were concerned" (interview,
2/21/99).
There thus seemed to be a major disjuncture between
women's views of their role and the welfare system's pri-
orities. One woman did, however, worry about role models
for children, thus expressing some support of the work
ethic:
I agree basically really your kids come first, they're impor-
tant, but for me it's a bit different in that I'm mum, dad,
grandparents, everybody to my children and so I'm constantly
aware of what to provide all of these role models and for me
it's very important that I show my children you can do that
and be self-sufficient, you don't have to be dependent on the
state. [Sandra Temple, focus group, 2/19/99]
The women's most common response to the admonition to
engage in paid work, however, was hopelessness—a sense
that they were being asked to do the impossible:
I'm a fighter, but I'll tell you what, I've just . . . felt like lying
down and dying and I've seen other people lie down and die
and it's heartbreaking to see your own, to see people that, you
know, that really have been onto it . . . just curl up and die,
you know, and yet for what, over money, you know, and
we're a country that we know we've been really self-suffi-
cient, we're all strong people, we're good people. I know that
most of us are not perfect, but what the hell do you do to de-
serve to be denied the very things that you were brought up to
believe in, you know, like our belief that was instilled in us by
our parents, and we're not all bums and losers like we've been
made out to be. [Kathy Fletcher, focus group, 2/19/99]
In sum, our New Zealand respondents circled around four
main themes: a sense of nostalgia for a recently lost past,
an increasing disjuncture between women's priorities and
those of the welfare system, an emphasis on women as
mothers, and an assertion that children needed parenting
until they reached adulthood.
Transitions
Data in both countries indicate that the concept of "tran-
sition" is both immensely useful and problematic. To com-
plicate matters, several transitions are indexed in the data,
not all of which we have the time or space to illustrate in
detail in this article. Here we focus on transitions that illus-
trate general points of similarity and difference between
the two countries.
One notion of transition that was evident in the dis-
course of respondents in both countries concerned transi-
tions in motherhood. In neoliberal discourse, as in certain
kinds of liberal feminism, it is as though motherhood has
become a transitional phase between periods of educa-
tion/training and "real" work (i.e., paid employment). It is
more than the fact that the period of time allocated in
women's lives to childbearing and child rearing has shrunk
or that these activities have become increasingly op-
tional—though such changes are real. Rather, the status of
motherhood, which, in the welfarism based on "full em-
ployment" of male breadwinners in single-income nuclear
families, had been an identity defining most women from
marriage until old age, is no longer the uninterrupted, long-
term, and primary role it once was assumed to be.
One sign of the transition to generic worker evident in
both contexts is that the role which female DPB and AFDC
recipients were explicitly paid to carry out—mothering—
remains overwhelmingly tacit in the women's accounts of
bureaucratic advice and policing. References to mothering
and welfare in our transcripts were typically situated in
terms of complaints of how unsupportive the agencies of
state are in their proper conduct and of how insignificant
the place of children is in the assessment of need (see U.S.
transcript #3 and New Zealand transcripts #1 and #3). In
the New Zealand case in particular, this represents a
marked change from the intrusively child-oriented policies
of previous New Zealand welfare regimes (e.g., the ubiqui-
tous Plunket Society and the Maori district nurse scheme,
which were integral to the first phases of the "cradle-to-
grave" welfare system).23
In modern nation-states, motherhood has generally been
portrayed as a natural "calling," as opposed to a job.
Now it is supposed to be not only a vocation that women
can undertake without training or direct state support but
one that has to compete with training for the "real work"
of paid labor, at a time arbitrarily chosen by the state,
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which currently ranges from when children reach 14 in
New Zealand to a variety of much younger ages in the
United States. This transition has been more abrupt and re-
cent, and therefore more jarring, in New Zealand, which
may explain the New Zealand women's greater rejection
of the work ethic and greater nostalgia for the past. Thus
many of our New Zealand respondents harked back to an
indeterminate and quasi-mythical past in which the welfare
state provided the kind of support and nurturance compat-
ible with New Zealanders' self-image of egalitarianism
and justice. This rhetoric of nostalgia is best summed up in
Tara Taniwha's reference to "once upon a time" (see New
Zealand transcript #1, lines 9-10).24 In general, however,
our interview data suggest that many New Zealand and
U.S. single mothers resent this construction of them as
workers or workers-in-waiting (see U.S. transcript #2 and
New Zealand transcript #2). And yet even those who are
most critical of this construction also engage in it, perhaps
because they have little choice. They strive to (re-)create
themselves as "flexible workers" through training and edu-
cation.
In addition to the difference in relation to levels of nos-
talgia, the New Zealand and U.S. women also differed in
terms of who they felt was obliged to support them in their
roles as mothers. As U.S. transcript #3 indicates, the U.S.
women were oriented toward men and the nuclear family.
They felt clearly that welfare reform should target fathers
as well as mothers, and they valorized the nuclear family (a
valorization shared by PRWORA). In contrast, the New
Zealand women were overwhelmingly oriented to the state
for the support of mothering in cases of family breakdown.
Their (financial) lament was not so much for the loss of
husbands' support but for the loss of what they referred to
as their "entitlements" from the state; and they complained
that representatives of the state now "all treat you as if
you're coming in and trying to get them in and it's their
money and they're going to hang onto it" (focus group,
2/19/99). This is not to claim that familial relationships
were unimportant to the New Zealand women; rather, it is
to say that they had grown up with a cradle-to-grave wel-
farism that had suddenly disappeared.
Conclusions: Where to Next?
Our respondents did not appear to routinely monitor the
broader changes underpinning the neoliberal agenda in
welfare "reform." They were generally in agreement that
changes had occurred, usually for the worse (thus the
rhetoric of nostalgia) but not unequivocally so. Some were
in fact quite happy about a few of these changes (e.g., the
encouragement to educate themselves for future employ-
ment, the transition from physically queuing in buildings
to temporally queuing on telephones, etc.). But, on the
whole, policy changes seemed irrelevant except insofar as
they had a direct impact on the women we listened to.
Their horizons were, understandably, often focused on
questions of survival, such as, Has my benefit been raised,
lowered, or kept at the same rate since the last payment?
Will it be paid at all, and if not, whose fault will that be?
Whom will I have to deal with if there is a problem? What
new rule change is in operation this week but may be su-
perceded or ignored by the next? In both countries, welfare
for poor single mothers has always been relatively grudg-
ing, punitive, and intrusive. The boundaries between de-
serving and undeserving may be changed by cultural pres-
sure and policy fiat but the fact of the boundary itself
remains, and it is one which women interacting with the
system must learn to negotiate flexibly.
Aside from their need to deal with bureaucracies on a
day-to-day basis and to focus on the here and now for their
children, there is another reason why the accounts of most
beneficiaries are more contingent and complex than the
metanarrative(s) of comparative welfare policy research-
ers: the women concerned have qualified for the DPB and
AFDC at different times in their histories and for varied
lengths of time over those histories. For some of them,
even if conditions on welfare may be said to have gotten
"objectively" worse (reduced benefits, tighter eligibility
restrictions), their ability to deal with the system may have
improved. One of our New Zealand respondents, Evelyn
Haines, for instance, described herself as being in a state of
shock during her first year on the DPB, when conditions
were relatively benign. Over the next four years, however,
while conditions on the DPB have steadily worsened, she
adapted to become a skilled and resourceful manipulator of
the system. Women in the United States made similar
points about learning the ropes—not only through their
own time and experiences on welfare but also from those
of other recipients (Kingfisher 1996a, 1996b).
In short, these women engage at a distance from and ata
tangent to the historical processes of globalization that pro-
vide a context for welfare reform. It is important in our at-
tempts to understand their experiences, therefore, that we
do not mirror the arrogance of governmental welfare
providers, in general, and neoliberal reformers, in particu-
lar. Even commentators on different sides of the ideologi-
cal struggle over the future of welfare have a tendency to
share certain assumptions, such as the view that policy
changes flow from the rich, powerful, and privileged to
those less fortunate and that long-term historical changes
map evenly onto the lives of individuals. Our research and
analysis suggest that we need to be wary of this curious
permutation of "trickle-down" theory. The triumph of neo-
liberalism may be short-lived. The U.S. women were not
ready to completely sacrifice themselves to the god of indi-
vidual responsibility. Nor has the ethos of egalitarianism
been totally extinguished in New Zealand. Indeed, our data
show that it occupies a cultural space from which it may
yet reemerge as a resource for political mobilization. The
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election in late 1999 of a leftward-leaning Labour/Alliance
coalition government provides one manifestation of this.
Finally, while globalization may have eased the spread
of neoliberal agendas by undermining the sovereignty of
nation-states, by the same token it may have created open-
ings for transnational organizations and international agree-
ments to oppose those agendas. In other words, in a global
system, "membership in nation-states ceases to be the only
ground for the realization of rights" (Sassen 1996b:33); the
global system itself has created "practical and formal
openings for the participation of non-State actors" (Sassen
I996b:32). Supra- and transnational organizations, then,
along with international legal instruments, may provide
arenas for the assertion of social rights being denied at the
level of the nation-state. Further development of the argu-
ment that social rights are part of the rights of citizenship—
and the extension of ideas of citizenship to the international
level—will serve to buttress the work of such bodies as the
U.N. Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(Hunt 1996). In addition, work at the national level, such as
the Social Charter drafted by Canada's National Anti-
Poverty Organization, provides potentially useful models
for a variety of global actors (Hunt 1996). Anthropology
can contribute to such transnational efforts at intervention
by continuing to produce fine-grained and, above all, com-
parative ethnographic analyses of the articulations of what
we currently refer to as the global and the local.
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Acknowledgments. For their helpful comments on earlier
drafts of this article, we would like to thank Norman Buchig-
nani, Edit Horvath-Hallett, Paul Letkmann, Claudia Strauss,
the guest editors for this Theme issue, especially Rae Bridg-
man, and the anonymous reviewers for American Anthropolo-
gist. Portions of the first section of this article are from King-
fisher in press.
1. For the most part, we will refer to the country as New
Zealand. Our title's use of the combined term Aotearoa/New
Zealand may require some explanation then. We have alluded
to it for two reasons. First, like many social scientists, we wish
to register the Maori renaissance in cultural, constitutional,
and political life (notwithstanding the evidence that Maori
people have been even more disadvantaged by recent changes
in New Zealand political economy than Pakeha, or "whites").
"Aotearoa" is used in most Maori-language discourse as the
official name of the country and is recognized as such by the
population at large. Second, the forward slash mark in the dual
noun "Aotearoa/New Zealand" indexes at a metaphorical
level the cultural and economic divide referred to above, a dis-
tinction by which the experiences of Maori and Pakeha cannot
be simply assimilated to one another. However, while our
sample of respondents includes both categories of people,
Pakeha are in the great majority, and so, where we cannot be
sure that there is a distinctively Maori dimension to the data,
the name "New Zealand" alludes to the nation-state in which
their responses have been formed. The question of whether
welfare reform and state restructuring have taken a distinctive
path in reshaping "Aotearoa" remains an open question and
one we would like to explore further.
2. As we discuss below in the sections "Neoliberalism" and
"From (Gendered) Mother to (Generic) Worker," the notion of
able-bodiedness builds on particular constructions of indi-
vidualism that do not fit the realities of many poor mothers'
lives.
3. This is not to claim that all single parents are women or
that poor men are not also the targets of reform. Our argument,
rather, is that the relationship among gender, parenting, and
paid labor is being transformed, with the effect that women's
primary responsibility for mothering is erased (yet still as-
sumed) and that they are accordingly expected to be breadwin-
ners. Interestingly, when men are single parents they are
awarded considerable (albeit informal) recognition for this
role. While full-time working mothers used to be considered
unusual, this is no longer the case.
4. One of the enduring paradoxes of New Zealand's "quiet
revolution" (James 1986) is that it was largely carried out by
an administration supposedly representative of the country's
egalitarian and "social democratic" past. It was a Labour gov-
ernment elected in 1984 that set the reform process in place,
though many of the changes that have most severely affected
poor single women were introduced or intensified by the sub-
sequent National (i.e., "conservative") government elected in
1990 and twice since returned to power.
5. By cultural system, we mean a paradigm for under-
standing and organizing the world and for informing our prac-
tice in it. Neoliberalism is not, then, simply an idea, or a way
of thinking about economics but an approach to the world,
which includes in its purview not only economics but also
politics, not only the public but also the private, not only what
kinds of institutions we should have but also what kinds of
subjects we should be.
In conceptualizing neoliberalism as a cultural system, we
wish to highlight its constructed, contingent, and contradic-
tory nature (see Comaroff and Comaroff 1992). First, neolib-
eralism is a social construction, insofar as we understand all
cultural systems to be fabrications, elements of which have
been naturalized. This is not to claim that it is easily decon-
structed but, rather, to point out that it is a human invention,
the artifact of particular historical and material practices and
struggles. The view of a historically situated and unfolding
phenomenon leads to our second point, namely, that neoliber-
alism is contingent. Like any culture, it is never fait accompli
but is always in need of accomplishment. Finally, neoliberal-
ism is not a "monolithic apparatus that is completely know-
able and in full control of the 'New Right' " (Larner 1999:13);
it is not coherent, but contradictory. As Comaroff and Coma-
roff assert, "culture always contains within it polyvalent, po-
tentially contestable messages, images, and actions" (1992:
27). This potential contestability points, in turn, to the power
relationships inherent in culture, power here relating to both
"the force of meaning and the meaning of force" (Comaroff
and Comaroff 1992:28).
6. Welfare history in the United States, as well as in New
Zealand, is considerably more nuanced than that being pre-
sented here. Mothers' Pensions, for instance, were complicated
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and uneven across states, as were relief measures in existence
prior to Mothers' Pensions. It is not our goal here to provide a
detailed historical analysis of the development of the U.S. or
New Zealand welfare states. Rather, our aim is to sketch broad
brush strokes of historical generalities in order to provide a
context for the ethnographic data that follow. Those interested
in more detailed historical analyses of the U.S. and New Zea-
land welfare states could consult, for example, Boston et al.
1999; Koven and Michael 1990; Skocpol 1991; and Rudd and
Roper 1997.
7. New Zealand has a three-tiered system, consisting of (1)
benefits for "categories of people who are likely to be in
need—the unemployed, the sick, invalids, widows and sole
parents" (Stephens 1999:240); (2) supplementary assistance,
"which recognises that different people have different un-
avoidable expenditures" (Stephens 1999) (e.g., accommoda-
tion supplement and child care subsidy); and (3) "safety net"
assistance for emergency and special needs (Stephens 1999).
Notably, the DPB is on the same tier as unemployment and
old-age pensions. In addition, all programs are funded through
general tax revenues. In contrast, the United States has a two-
tiered system divided between (1) social assistance (e.g., un-
employment and social security) and (2) financial assistance
(e.g., "welfare'VAFDC). Social assistance, funded through the
contributions of paid workers, is the less stigmatized of the
two tiers, while AFDC, falling in the second tier, has been
highly stigmatized, at least in part because it has been "non-
contributory," that is, funded through general revenues (i.e., at
taxpayers' expense).
8. Esping-Andersen (1996:10) refers to three "distinct wel-
fare state responses to economic and social change": the Scan-
dinavian route, consisting of expansion of welfare state em-
ployment; the labor reduction route, followed in continental
Europe; and the neoliberal route, followed by the Anglo-
Saxon countries, including the United States and New Zea-
land.
9. We use the term workfare to refer to a constellation of
work-related activities that may include education/training,
active employment searches, and volunteer work, as well as
paid employment.
10. The 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA)
did two things to AFDC: it reduced federal outlays to AFDC
by 14.3 percent, and it tightened eligibility requirements. In
addition, and building on the 1967 Work Incentive Program,
greater emphasis was placed on the idea of workfare, insofar
as states were now both permitted and encouraged to imple-
ment state-administered work programs. These changes were
designed to contribute to then President Reagan's goals of
smaller government, increased productivity (insofar as wel-
fare recipients were not considered productive), and greater
labor force flexibility (by getting recipients to respond to busi-
ness needs) (O'Connor 1998). In terms of the latter two goals,
OBRA marked the beginning of a shift in ideas concerning
women's roles as mothers versus workers (Abramovitz 1988).
11. Three aspects of the Family Support Act of 1988 (FSA)
are noteworthy here. First, by decreasing federal standards and
oversight, the act gave states more administrative control over
welfare. The act also put into effect parental responsibility
measures, the most notable being the garnering of absent fa-
thers' wages. Finally, and most important for our discussion,
FSA extended the workfare option of OBRA by mandating
workfare in all states for AFDC recipients with children over
particular ages (from one to three, depending on the state)
(O'Connor 1998).
12. Three aspects of PRWORA are particularly relevant.
First, welfare provision is devolved to the state level, with the
federal contribution now being provided in the form of block
grants. The outcome of this devolution is a decrease in the
standardization of both benefit levels and program require-
ments. Second, AFDC has been officially eliminated and re-
placed with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).
The temporary in TANF indexes the new provision that no
one receive welfare benefits for more than five years over the
course of their lifetime, the idea being to eliminate cross-gen-
erational welfare. Finally, in addition to lifetime limits, and
with the help of increased transitional Medicaid and child care
benefits, recipients are now required to be involved in work-
related activity by the end of two years on the welfare rolls, on
penalty of losing their benefits. The goal of this requirement is
to reduce dependency on the welfare system by increasing
self-sufficiency.
13. In 1992, maximum AFDC benefits for a family of three
ranged from 15 percent to 95 percent of the federal poverty
guidelines, depending on the state. For the United States as a
whole, median benefits were 39 percent of the poverty line.
Nationally, from 1970-92, the median purchasing power of
AFDC benefits fell 43 percent. More than half of that reduc-
tion occurred between 1980 and 1992 (Center on Budget and
Policy Priorities 1992, cited in Axinn and Hirsch 1993).
14. This is not to imply that we consider workfare a posi-
tive thing or that New Zealand is in any way "behind the
times."
15. What this translated into in terms of the DPB was a re-
duction of the benefit for a single adult with one child by
$25/week. Adjusted for inflation, benefit levels are now back
to what the New Zealand 1972 Royal Commission on Social
Security described as subsistence level (Boston et al., eds.
1999:301). In addition, these changes in benefit levels must be
situated in the wider context of simultaneous changes to the
health system and to housing assistance programs. Taken to-
gether, policy changes required that beneficiaries had to pay
for more services with fewer resources.
16. There were two pieces of follow-up to the 1996 bill.
First, in early 1997, the New Zealand Social Welfare Depart-
ment sponsored a "Beyond Dependency" conference, in
which high-ranking proponents of welfare reform in the
United States were featured as key speakers. Particular em-
phasis was placed on WisconsinWorks, a program widely
known for its stringent emphasis on "personal responsibility,"
"independence," and workfare. The point of the conference
was to signal a change in approach to welfare, and it is perhaps
not surprising that the conference was held immediately prior
to the institution of the changes called for in the 1996 bill. As
part of this change in New Zealand's approach to welfare, in
February 1998 the government mailed a proposed "Code of
Social and Family Responsibility" to every household in the
nation. The document outlined a code of individual and family
(i.e., private) responsibility for economic, social, and physical
well-being, mirroring in many ways the discourse of welfare
reform in the United States, from which it got its inspiration.
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17. This second option draws heavily on the idea of con-
tract. The kind of contract at issue here, however, "typically
takes the form of the exchange of obedience for protection"
(Pateman 1988:31). The relevance of this insight for women's
relationship to state provisioning is obvious. In this vein,
Brown (1995) underscores the perversity of depending on pro-
tection on from that which one must most fear violation—by
which she means either individual men, in the case of married
women, or "the man in the state," in the case of single moth-
ers. The parties to such a contract are not equal but, in fact,
specifically unequal. In this asymmetrical "contract," "if one
party is in an inferior position . . . , then he or she has no
choice but to agree to disadvantageous terms offered by the
superior party" (Pateman 1988:57-58). Thus "one party to the
contract, who provides protection, has the right to determine
how the other party will act to fulfill their side of the ex-
change" (Pateman 1988:59; see also Fraser and Gordon 1992).
The assumption that parties to a contract are what Yeatman
(1997) refers to as full contractual persons is thus erroneous.
And whereas liberal theory previously awarded "protection"
and charity to those deemed to be less than full contractual
persons, such "protection" is no longer acceptable under neo-
liberalism. Indeed, it is deemed to be patronizing and disem-
powering, contributing to the creation of a particularly insidi-
ous form of "unfreedom."
18. See Russell and Edgar 1998 for a discussion of the im-
portance of analyzing the experience of welfare.
19. All organizational, place, and personal names are pseu-
donyms.
20. This fits with findings from other research in the
United States, for example, Seccombe et al. 1998.
21. A key problem for all the U.S. women was that
AFDC's child care provisions did not cover their actual child
care needs. The combination of low pay (on the non-"family
wage" assumption that employees had only themselves to sup-
port) with poor AFDC child care provisions placed incredible
stress on single mothers who were forced to opt for substan-
dard child care.
Given that the recognition for the women's roles as primary
breadwinners was not forthcoming, the women nevertheless
struggled to fulfill both roles, asserting their identities as self-
less, self-sacrificing, caring mothers who would do anything
to meet the needs of their children. As Susan Harrison put it in
a discussion of prostitution, "They ((her family)) tell me I
ought to be ashamed for what I do and what I've done ((prosti-
tution)) and I look at them and I says 'NO,' you know, 'when
I'm ashamed is when my kids ain't got no shoes' " (interview,
4/4/90). This perspective fits with Edin and Lein's (1997)
findings on single mothers' efforts to juggle low-paid labor
and mothering.
22. According to Goffman (1963:107), stigmatized indi-
viduals, many of whom have internalized the societal stand-
ards of which they fall short, tend to stratify the groups of
which they are members "according to the degree to which
their stigma is apparent and obtrusive," allowing them to treat
others lower on the hierarchy similarly to how they are treated
by society.
23. These two schemes provided on-the-ground parenting
support and advice. Plunket nurses, for example, made regular
home visits during babies' first six weeks to check feeding
habits and weight gain, sleeping patterns, and so on.
24. This sense that things used to be much better is by no
means erroneous. There are good grounds to suggest that the
period of the 1960s and 1970s, in particular, was marked by
welfare provisions of greater generosity and universality than
anything achieved before or since (St. John 1998). For poor
single mothers in New Zealand, this kind of inclusiveness
reached a peak in the few years after the introduction of the
DPB in 1973. It was as though the universalism of the welfare
state had simply taken its next natural and logical step. For the
early beneficiaries of this system and the activists who worked
with them to change it, there was a sense of euphoria. By the
late 1980s, however, the DPB itself started to go through a se-
ries of transitions that steadily eroded its generosity and ease
of access. It became less generous and more targeted. There
has also been a major transition in the delivery of benefits,
marked by changes in technology and self-governance.
Whereas, up until the mid-1990s, all beneficiaries (not just
those on, or hoping to get on, the DPB) had been required to
report in person to the Department of Social Welfare (or its
later incarnations), after that time, beneficiaries were increas-
ingly expected to report over the phone. Face-to-face interac-
tion became less frequent and beneficiaries had to become
adept at the rituals of mediated communication that charac-
terize contemporary life (800 numbers, touch-tone flowpaths
through the bureaucratic maze, and unreturned calls). Those
who succeed in this new and detached world do so through a
combination of patience, persistence, good phone manners,
and verbal skills. The process contributes to their constitution
as self-motivated workers, do expectations that they will en-
gage in training and part-time work (or at least attempt to find
work, as demonstrated by job-search diaries and rejection let-
ters). In addition to the "goal-setting" meetings described by
our respondents (see discussion under New Zealand transcript
#3), and according to our respondent Diane Bould, the cur-
riculum vitae (CV) is now becoming a normal part of benefi-
ciaries' presentation of self—a phenomenon that would have
been unheard of 20 years ago, when most beneficiaries would
not have even heard of a CV. In the New Zealand context,
Harris (1998) draws parallels between the CV of curriculum
vitae and the CV of the cardiovascular fitness required of the
new responsible citizen-worker. Similar sorts of changes have
also been noted by anthropologists (e.g., Martin 1995).
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